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Abstract—Operators of micro-grid as privately-owned 
sectors try to optimally determine their energy supply strategy 
aiming at maximizing their profits. Smart grid infrastructures 
enable residential consumers to modify their electricity 
consumption in response to energy prices. Clearly, increasing 
energy tariffs have positive impacts on the operator’s profit. 
Additionally, sensitivity of consumption to selling prices leads to 
demand reduction by increasing energy tariffs. Therefore, 
operators of micro-grids retain a tradeoff between energy 
tariffs and demand. This paper presents a game theoretical 
approach for operators of micro-grids to supply the required 
energy of price-sensitive clients. Additionally, the information-
gap decision theory (IGDT) is used to handle the financial risk 
arising from the uncertain wholesale prices. Simulation results 
justify the performance of the proposed approach. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
   In deregulated electricity distribution networks, the micro-
grid operator (MO) functions as an intermediary between the 
wholesale market and small consumers. In other words, MOs 
supply the required energy of consumers from competitive 
markets or their self-generating facilities. MOs as privately-
owned sectors try to optimally determine the energy 
providing strategy and selling prices aiming at maximizing 
their expected profits. Consequently, the selling price may be 
set in a manner covering the supply cost and providing an 
acceptable profit for MOs. Mainly, the wholesale energy 
price is highly volatile and varies every hour. Accordingly, 
ignoring the uncertainty pertaining to the wholesale price 
may impose significant financial losses to energy providers. 
Also, the fluctuation of clients’ demand is another 
uncertainty source faced by MOs. Since a considerable 
quantity of electrical energy is not storable in an economical 
manner, the energy shortage should be resolved in the spot 
market. Clearly, the spot markets’ prices are usually higher 
than the day-ahead or hour-ahead ones. Therefore, 
unpredicted demand fluctuations impose additional supply 
costs to MOs. Accordingly, it is vital to develop a proficient 
non-deterministic energy procurement strategy for MO 
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hedged against the inherent uncertainty of the wholesale 
prices.  
   The optimal energy procurement strategy of MOs is 
previously analyzed by means of different approaches in the 
literature. In [1], a stochastic framework is proposed for 
managing renewable energy resources in a micro-grid. The 
bidding strategy of MO under uncertainty is evaluated in [2]. 
In [3], the optimal operation of energy storage in micro-grids 
is formulated. In [4], the impact of electrical vehicles and 
load elasticity on operation of micro-grids is modeled. In [5], 
a stochastic framework is proposed for simultaneously 
managing both electrical and thermal loads. In [6], a bi-level 
model is proposed to determine the economical and optimal 
operation of micro-grids. In [7], the optimal size of 
renewable energy resources in a micro-grid is determined. In 
[8], a multi-objective framework is presented to 
simultaneously optimize the cost and emission of a micro-
grid. In summary, previous research works usually either 
discount the uncertain nature of energy procurement in 
micro-girds or account them in terms of probability 
distributions. However, in practice, it is hard to obtain the 
exact probability distributions for different types of 
uncertainty sources [9]. Therefore, it is necessary to develop 
more practical approaches instead of typical probability 
distribution-based approaches.    
    The smart metering/measuring facilities enable end-use 
consumers to monitor selling prices and determine their 
consumption. Therefore, MO and consumers face a game to 
specify their optimal strategies. In this game, MO specifies 
the selling price in a way maximizing profits. According the 
proposed selling prices, consumers adjust their demands. 
Hence, offering the higher selling price reduces the demand 
that may lead to lower profit for MO. In this research work, a 
game theoretical approach is addressed to evaluate the 
optimal strategy of MO. Moreover, the information-gap 
decision theory (IGDT) as a proficient uncertainty handling 
method is used to characterize the uncertainty of the 
wholesale prices without requiring any probability 
distribution [9]. The main contributions of this research work 
can be summarized as follows: 
1) A robust framework is presented to determine the optimal 
strategy of MO and clients’ consumption based on the 
consumers’ sensitivity to selling prices. 
2) The game theory methodology is applied to evaluate the 
clients’ response to sale prices. 
   The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
represents the proposed energy providing strategy. The game 
theoretical approach is introduced in Section III to specify 
the optimal selling price and demand. The IGDT-based 
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formulations are given in Section IV to evaluate the financial 
risk of price uncertainty. The performance of the proposed 
framework is evaluated in Section V using a case study. 
Finally, concluding remarks are provided in Section VI. 
II. OPTIMAL FRAMEWORK OF MO 
     To determine the demand, sale prices, and the energy 
acquisition strategy, objective functions of clients and MO 
are introduced in this section. 
A. Clients’ Objective Function 
   In this work, a linear demand-price model is used to 
characterize the sensitivity of demand to selling price as 
follows: 
( )( )0 0 01 / ;Mt t t t t td d t Tε= + ⋅ Π − Π Π ∀ ∈
          
(1a) 
( ) ( )0 0/ ;rett t t td d t Tε = Π ⋅ Δ ⋅ ΔΠ ∀ ∈              (1b) 
where td  is the demand at hour t,
0
td  is the initial demand at 
hour t, 0tΠ  is the initial selling price at hour t,
M
tΠ  is the 
micro-grid’s selling price, and tε  is the elasticity of demand 
at hour t. Also, T denotes the set of all hours. Equation (1a) 
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   To quantify the benefit of consumption td , it is assumed 
that the sensitivity of the benefit function (i.e., tB ) to the 
hourly demand is equal to the sale price as given below [11]: 
/ ;Mt t tB d t T∂ ∂ = Π ∀ ∈
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   The profit of clients (i.e., clPr ) is equal to the benefit of 
electricity consumption minus the supply cost. Hence, the 








t t t t t t t
D
t t t
Max Pr B d d
dε ε
  Π
= + Π ⋅ − ⋅Π + ⋅ − Π ⋅ 
    
(6) 
  
min max ;t t td d d t T≤ ≤ ∀ ∈                        (7) 
where mintd /
max
td  denotes the minimum/maximum allowable 
limitation of the consumption at hour t. According to (6), 
clients can respond to the selling price and can modify the 
optimal consumption to maximize the profit. 
B. MO’s Objective Function 
   MO tries to determine the energy acquisition framework to 
maximize the profit. According to MO’s income (i.e., MtI ) 
and supply cost (i.e., MtC ), the profit function can be 
calculated as given below: 




= −                               (8) 
   Here, it is assumed that the required energy of clients is 
provided by distributed generators (DGs), wholesale market, 
and forward contract. Accordingly, the supply cost at hour t 
can be obtained as given in (9): 





tC represent the total costs of 
purchasing electricity from the wholesale market, the 
forward contract, and the total operation cost of DGs at hour 
t, respectively. The procured power BWStP and the wholesale 
price WStΠ affect the wholesale procurement costs at hour t as 
given in (10): 
; 0B BWS WSWS WSt t t tC P P t T= ⋅Π ≥ ∀ ∈             (10) 
   The entire procedure of modeling FCtC  is provided in [11]. 
According to [11], the cost of procuring power from the 
forward contract is formulated as given below: 
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t cP denotes the procured power from segment s in 
forward contract c at hour t, , ,
FC
t c sΠ denotes the price of 
segment s in forward contract c at hour t 
($/MWh),
c
tN denotes the total number of power segments in 
forward contract c, and , ,t c sθ denotes a binary variable, where 
this binary variable is equal to 1 if the procured power from 
forward contract c pertains to segment s and it is equal to 0 
otherwise. Also, Ξ represents the set of all available forward 
contracts. The operation-related costs of DG units including 
fuel costs ( ,
Fu
i tC ), startup costs ( ,i tSU ), and shutdown costs 







t i t i t i t
i
C C SU SD t T
=
= + + ∀ ∈              (12) 
   The fuel-related costs of the thermal DG units can be 
represented as given below: 
2
, , , ,( ) ; , 1,...,
Fu
i t i i t i i t i i t DGC a P b P c X t T i N= ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ ∀ ∈ =  (13) 
where Xi represents a binary status variable indicating 
up/down status of DG i ( , 1i tX =  if the DG is up, and 
, 0i tX =  otherwise) and ,ia ,ib and ic  represent the 
coefficients of the cost function for DG i. Also, the startup 
and shutdown costs can be calculated as given in (14) and 
(15), respectively: 
, , ; , 1,...,
SU
i t i i t DGC SU t T i Nγ= ⋅ ∀ ∈ =               (14) 
, , ; , 1,...,
SD
i t i i t DGC SD t T i Nη= ⋅ ∀ ∈ =                (15) 
where ,i tγ  in (14) and ,i tη  (15) are binary variables 
indicating the startup and shutdown status of DG i at hour t, 
respectively. Also, the following relations hold 
between ,i tγ , ,i tη , and ,i tX : 
  
, , 1; , 1,...,i t i t DGt T i Nγ η+ ≤ ∀ ∈ =                 (16) 
, , , , 1; , 1,...,i t i t i t i t DGX X t T i Nγ η −− = − ∀ ∈ =        (17) 
   In the proposed framework, it is assumed that MO can 
resell the energy to the wholesale market as well as the final 
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where SWStP  represents the sold power in the wholesale 
market. Also, the operation-related constraints of DGs are 
given below [11]: 
   - Minimum Up-time Constraint 
( ) ( ), 1 ,min , 1 , 0; , 1,...,iup upC t i i t i t DGT T X X t T i N− −− ⋅ − ≥ ∀ ∈ = (19) 
where ,i
up
C tT denotes the up-time hours for DG i before hour t, 
,min
up
iT denotes the minimum up-time of DG i. 
   -Minimum Down-time Constraint 
( ) ( ), 1 ,min , , 1 0; , 1,...,idown downC t i i t i t DGT T X X t T i N− −− ⋅ − ≥ ∀ ∈ =  (20) 
where ,i
down
C tT denotes the down-time hours for DG i before 
hour t, ,min
down
iT  denotes the minimum down-time of DG i. 
   - Ramp-rate Constraint 
  , , 1 , ,
; , 1,...,up sui t i t i i t i i t DGP P R X R t T i Nγ−− ≤ ⋅ + ⋅ ∀ ∈ =      (21) 
, 1 , , 1 , ; , 1,...,
down sd
i t i t i i t i i t DGP P R X R t T i Nη− −− ≤ ⋅ + ⋅ ∀ ∈ =    (22) 






iR  stand for ramp-up rate, 
startup ramp-rate, ramp-down rate, and shutdown ramp-rate 
limits for DG  i, respectively. 
   - Capacity Constraint 
min max
, , , ; , 1,...,i i t i t i i t DGP X P P X t T i N⋅ ≤ ≤ ⋅ ∀ ∈ =   (23) 
   - Supply-Demand Constraint 
   The total procured power from the wholesale market and 
the forward contract as well as the power production of DGs 
should be equal to the amount of sold power in the wholesale 








t i t t t t
i
P P P P d t T
=
+ + = + ∀ ∈            (24) 
   By substituting (10), (11), (13), (14), (15), and (18) in (8), 
the profit function of MO can be rewritten as follows: 
( )
, , ,
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subject to (16), (17), (19)-(24). 
III. GAME THEORY FRAMEWORK 
   The game theory is a mathematical decision-making tool to 
find the optimal strategy in cooperative or non-cooperative 
optimization problems between players. In the game theory-
based models, the equilibrium of the game refers to a 
strategy where no player can profit via unilaterally changing 
their strategies. As mentioned before, the energy trading 
between MO and price-sensitive clients can be characterized 
as a game. Although MO can obtain the maximum profit in a 
particular selling price, it does not mean that clients can 
obtain their maximum profit at the same selling price. The 
higher selling price increases MOs’ profit and decreases the 
clients’ consumption. 
   In the proposed game theory-based model, the optimal 
strategy (i.e., MΠ  and d ) is a Nash Equilibrium (NE) if no 
unilateral deviation in the strategy (i.e., selling price for MO 
and consumption for clients) by any single player (i.e., MO 
and clients) is profitable for that player as given below: 
: , : ( , ) ( , )cl M MO MClient d D d d Pr d Pr d∀ ∈ ≠ Π ≥ Π    (26) 
: , : ( , ) ( , )M M M MO M MO MMO Pr d Pr d∀Π ∈Θ Π ≠Π Π ≥ Π    (27) 
where d  denotes the consumption of clients (i.e., 
{ }1 2, ,..., Td d d d= ), D  denotes the set of feasible 
consumption (i.e., { }1 2, ,..., TD D D D= ), MΠ  denotes the 
micro-grid’s price (i.e., { }1 2, ,...,M M M MTΠ = Π Π Π ), and Θ  
denotes the set of feasible selling price (i.e., 
{ }1 2, ,..., TΘ = Θ Θ Θ ). 
The IGDT-based risk-management approach is presented 
in the next section. 
IV. INFORMATION-GAP DECISION THEORY 
   The IGDT methodology is a non-probabilistic risk-
management approach to determine a robust solution under 
different uncertainty sources [9], [10]. The information-gap 
models quantify the variation interval of the uncertain 
variable as the gap between what is known and what is 
unknown. The variation interval, which is designated as the 






t Tλ λΠ − Π ≤ ≥ ∀ ∈
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                 (28) 
where WStΠ denotes the expected values of the hourly energy 
prices. The gap between the known and unknown values of 
uncertain price is modeled by λ . In the IGDT-based models, 
the robustness region or λ and the optimal decision can be 
obtained by means of the desired performance function. Two 
types of performance functions are presented in the IGDT 
methodology: robustness and opportunity. The robustness 
function determines the maximum variation interval of the 
uncertain parameter that ensuring the minimum profit is 
within the robustness region. The opportunity function 
determines the minimum variation interval that ensuring the 
maximum desired profit is achievable for at least one price 
belonging to the robustness region. The risk-averse MOs 
select the lower risk level. Consequently, they choose the 
  
robustness function. The risk-taker MOs select the higher 
risk level to obtain the desired performance. Consequently, 
they choose the opportunity function and specify the optimal 
strategy based on the best condition up to the horizon of 
uncertainty. These functions can be written as follows:  
, , ,, , , ,
, , 0,..., , 1,...,
max . .
min ; (1 ) ,(1 )
(1 )
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 ≥ Π ∈ − Π + Π 
= + ×
(30) 
where ExpPr denotes the expected profit,
RAρ and RTρ denote 
the profit deviation factors of risk-averse and risk-taker 
MOs, respectively. It is worthwhile to note that MO’s profit 
can be obtained by means of (25). 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS 
   In this work, the presented energy acquisition strategy is 
implemented on a price-taker supplier who has four thermal 
DGs [11]. The characteristics of DGs as well as available 
stepwise forward contracts are similar to [11]. The initial 
selling prices (i.e., 0tΠ ), the initial demands (i.e.,
0
td ), and 
the expected values of wholesale prices (i.e., WStΠ ) at every 
hour are illustrated in Fig. 1. Moreover, the elasticity 
coefficients within low-load (i.e., hours 1-6), mid-load (i.e., 
hours 7-18), and peak-load hours (i.e., hours 19-24) are 
equal to -4, -4.8, and -5.2, respectively. In this research 
work, it is assumed that MO can offer the selling price based 














Π = Π = −
Π = − 
   The optimal framework of MO to provide the required 
energy of the price-sensitive clients and the demand at every 
hour are illustrated in Fig. 2. It is worthwhile to note that the 
wholesale prices in this case study are equal to the expected 
values, as depicted in Fig. 1. Simulation results demonstrate 
that the maximum profits of MO and clients are equal to 
$7416 and $2389.9, respectively. The optimal selling prices 
for low-load, mid-load, and peak-load hours (i.e., MLΠ ,
M
MΠ , 
and MPΠ ) are equal to $90.5, $108, and $114, respectively. 






Π = Π ) are provided in Fig. 3. As mentioned, a 
higher selling price leads to a higher profit for MO. 
However, the intelligent clients reduce their consumption by 
increasing the selling price. As depicted in Fig. 3, increasing 
the selling price has a negative impact on MO’s profit 
for 104.167 ($ / )M MWhΠ > . Also, Fig. 4 depicts the 
sensitivity of clients’ demand and profit to the average 
selling price. The sensitivity of the clients’ profit to the 
selling price is not linear. Table I and Table II demonstrate 
the effects of the variations of the wholesale prices on the 
optimal selling price and the MO’s profit, respectively. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Initial selling prices, initial demands, and expected wholesale prices. 
 
 




Fig. 3. MO’s profit versus average selling price. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Impact of average selling price on the clients’ profit and 
consumption. 
  
Table I. Optimal selling price for different variation intervals of wholesale 
prices ($/MWh). 
λ  Low-Load Mid-Load Peak-Load (1 )λ−  (1 )λ+  (1 )λ−  (1 )λ+  (1 )λ−  (1 )λ+  
0 90.5 90.5 108 108 114 114 
0.05 88.5 92 105.5 110 111.5 116.5 
0.1 86.5 94 103.5 112.5 109.5 119 
0.15 84.5 96 101 115 107 121.5 
0.2 83 97.5 98.5 117 104.5 124 
0.25 81 99.5 96.5 119.5 102 126.5 
0.3 79 101.5 94 122 99.5 129 
 
Table II. MO’s maximum and minimum profits for different variation 
intervals of wholesale prices ($). 
λ  Low-Load Mid-Load Peak-Load (1 )λ−  (1 )λ+  (1 )λ−  (1 )λ+  (1 )λ−  (1 )λ+  
0 829.53 829.53 4156.23 4156.23 2430.28 2430.28 
0.05 892.66 842.4 4157.91 4441.52 2380.09 2630.79 
0.1 1019.09 929.59 4426.77 5001.89 2463.83 2983.44 
0.15 1214.28 1092.65 4911.23 5751.68 2646.09 3451.9 
0.2 1470.58 1327.58 5614.23 6643.8 2942.38 3980.76 
0.25 1775.08 1631.38 6520.12 7664.82 3352.95 4563.32 
0.3 2117.18 1989.2 7614.54 8804.52 3866.75 5199.2 
 
Table III. Clients’ maximum and minimum profits for different variation 
intervals of wholesale prices ($). 
λ  Low-Load Mid-Load Peak-Load (1 )λ−  (1 )λ+  (1 )λ−  (1 )λ+  (1 )λ−  (1 )λ+  
0 504.64 504.64 1220.69 1220.69 664.57 664.57 
0.05 640.94 413.1 1653.72 921.5 872.39 484.98 
0.1 793.51 305.28 2047.39 606.57 1058.98 333.61 
0.15 962.36 213.73 2598.52 357.25 1317.62 210.48 
0.2 1099.68 155.75 3215.26 205.03 1604.49 115.58 
0.25 1297.01 92.69 3755.9 73.81 1919.59 48.91 
0.3 1510.62 45.9 4490.74 8.2 2262.92 10.48 
   
   Simulation results demonstrate that the minimum and 
maximum selling prices within the variation 
interval (1 ) , (1 )WS WSt tλ λ − Π + Π   are obtained at the 
minimum and maximum wholesale prices, which are equal to 
(1 ) WStλ− Π and (1 )
WS
tλ+ Π , respectively. In other words, by 
increasing wholesale prices, MO has to offer the higher 
selling price to cover the supply cost. Table II demonstrates 
that increasing the wholesale price uncertainty (i.e., variation 
interval) increases the minimum and maximum profits of 
MO. It is worthwhile to note that MO provides a major 
portion of the required energy of the clients at the low-price 
hours using the wholesale market. As mentioned above, MO 
has to offer the higher selling price within the high-price 
hours, which results in a lower consumption. Consequently, 
MO is capable of selling the surplus energy at the higher 
price in the wholesale market. Evidently, DGs and forward 
contracts enable MO to obtain a higher profit in all 
circumstances. The clients’ profit for different variation 
intervals of the wholesale prices is presented in Table III. 
According to the provided results, the maximum and 
minimum profits are obtained for the minimum and the 
maximum prices identified by the uncertainty horizon, which 
are equal to (1 ) WStλ− Π and (1 )
WS
tλ+ Π , respectively.  
   MO’s maximum profit versus the wholesale price deviation 
factor (i.e., /WS WSt tk = Π Π ) is depicted in Fig. 5. The 
minimum profit $7391 is obtained at k = 0.9711.  
 
 
Fig. 5. MO’s maximum profit versus k for the expected and the modified 
expected wholesale prices ($). 
 
 
Fig. 6. Modified expected wholesale prices. 
 
 




Fig. 8. Optimal strategy of the risk-taker MO (MW). 
 
This figure justifies that the clients’ price sensitivity, DGs, 
and forward contracts enable MO to obtain a higher profit at 
low-price and high-price hours. According to Fig. 5, 
  
for 0.0289λ ≥ , the minimum profit is equal to $7391 (the 
expected profit is equal to $7416). Therefore, the profit 
deviation factor of the risk-averse MO (i.e., RAρ ) in 
expression (29) cannot be higher than 0.0034. It is 
worthwhile to note that these results depend on WStΠ . 
Therefore, to evaluate the performance of the proposed 
robustness and opportunity functions, the expected values of 
the wholesale prices are modified according to Fig. 6. Also, 
to evaluate the optimal framework of the risk-averse and the 
risk-taker MOs based on the proposed robustness and 




crPr  in (29) and (30), are considered as $7500 
( 0.159RAρ = ) and $10500 ( 0.178RTρ = ), respectively. The 
optimal framework of the risk-averse MO is depicted in Fig. 
7. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed strategy 
within the maximum variation interval 0.0766 or 
0.9234 ,1.0766WS WSt t Π Π   guarantees the minimum profit 
$7500, which is obtained at 0.9234WS WSt tΠ = Π . Moreover, 
the selling prices MLΠ ,
M
MΠ , and 
M
PΠ  are equal to $91, 
$108.5 and $115, respectively. The maximum profit of 
clients based on the proposed strategy is equal to $2204.4. 
Fig. 8 demonstrates that the optimal framework of the risk-
taker MO. The minimum variation interval of the wholesale 
price, which ensures the maximum profit $10500, is equal to 
0.05148 ( 0.94852 ,1.05148WS WS WSt t t Π ∈ Π Π  ). The selling 
prices MLπ ,
M
Mπ , and 
M
Pπ  are equal to $96, $115 and $122, 
respectively. Moreover, the maximum profit is achieved 
at 1.05148WS WSt tΠ = Π . According to the proposed strategy 
for the risk-taker MO, the clients’ maximum profit is equal to 
$760.23. Comparing the results of Figs. 7 and 8 
demonstrates that the risk-averse and risk-taker MOs prefer 
to determine their optimal strategies based on the minimum 
and maximum wholesale prices, respectively. Therefore, 
risk-taker MOs have to offer the higher selling prices to their 
clients. According to (1a), increasing the selling price 
reduces the clients’ consumption. Hence, the risk-taker MO 
has more surplus energy for selling in the wholesale market. 
Additionally, the optimal power production of DGs in the 
risk-taker strategy is higher than the risk-averse one. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper presents a robust energy acquisition 
framework for micro-grid operators to determine the optimal 
energy procurement strategy based on the price uncertainty 
and demand sensitivity to the selling prices. MO’s profit 
depends on the selling price and demand, which are 
determined by MO and clients, respectively. Accordingly, by 
the game theoretical approach, the optimal selling prices are 
specified to simultaneously optimize the profits of the MO 
and clients. During the low-price hours, MO provides a 
major portion of the required energy of clients using the 
wholesale market. Additionally, by increasing the wholesale 
price, the selling price is increased, which results in the 
lower demand. Therefore, MO has more surplus energy for 
selling in the wholesale market. In other words, DGs, clients’ 
sensitivity to selling prices, and forward contracts enable 
MO to obtain a higher profit in all circumstances. To 
evaluate the optimal strategy based on the MO’s risk 
preferences, the robustness and opportunity performance 
functions are developed for the risk-averse and risk-taker 
MOs, respectively. Simulation results demonstrate that the 
risk-averse and risk-taker MOs prefer to determine their 
optimal strategies based on the minimum and maximum 
wholesale prices, respectively. According to the proposed 
framework, MO has to offers the higher selling prices within 
high-price hours to cover the supply cost. Therefore, the 
selling price of the risk-taker MO is higher than the risk-
averse MO. Moreover, the risk-taker MO prefers to 
participate in the wholesale market as a seller. The optimal 
power production of DGs in the risk-taker strategy is higher 
than the risk-averse one. 
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